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Abstract
Supply chain security is a hot topic for research, but
the specific phrase "supply chain security" has different
definitions for different groups. This paper presents a brief
taxonomy for both the terms supply chain and security, and
then explores a basic framework to help describe areas of
research in supply chain security. Security is broken down
into confidentiality, integrity, and availability; supply
chain is detailed as the networks, processes, and elements.
By creating a method for describing the research, we can
begin to create a framework of the research in supply
chain security. This framework allows us to see where
prior work has been done and allows us to focus on lessexplored areas. It also allows us to compare and translate
the supply chain research being performed in one field
(electronics), to other fields (e.g. food production, clothing
manufacturing).

1. Introduction
"Supply chain security" is a phrase with many
meanings in a variety of fields. For those in the
logistics world, it means, "can I get what I need when
I need it" [1]. For a business person, it may mean,
"can I ensure the security of the proprietary
information about my product" [2]. A software
designer must be interested in all the different people
who have submitted code to the project, and a
hardware vendor cares about who manufactured what
components and how. In the modern marketplace,
supply chain security may also include ensuring that
the workforce and products involved with the
creation of a product is ethically sourced [3, 4]. Prior
work has also focused on ensuring physical supply
chain security, especially focused on terrorism-driven
challenges [5].
This wealth of meaning has translated into two
different problems, both based on the difficulty of
communicating outside of a given field. The first
problem is that there are holes in the research, areas
of interest that have not yet been explored because
researchers just don't know they are holes. The other
problem is unnecessarily repeated research due to
different focus areas use a variety of different words
to describe the same concepts.
To remedy this, two things are needed: a
taxonomy and a framework. The taxonomy grounds
the conversation, facilitating communication between
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researchers from different backgrounds. A framework
is needed to lay out the areas of research, to describe
sections that have been explored and what requires
more research. Until groups share a language, they
cannot share research. Without a shared language,
research is isolated. Without a common map or
framework, research areas will be missed or
unnecessarily repeated. The goal of this paper is to
lay out a general map (framework) of the supply
chain security world, sketching in rough borders and
creating a basic shared language (taxonomy).
The first section of this paper provides a
framework that can be built upon to solve these
problems. The second section of this paper lays out a
high-level taxonomy, describing both the terms
"security" and "supply chain" at a level which will be
applicable from integrated circuit manufacturers to
hot-dog producers. The third section builds upon this
and lays out a basic framework for research, while the
fourth section presents case studies where the
techniques of one field have been migrated into
another field. We conclude in the fifth section with a
discussion of future work needed to develop the
framework into an actionable resource.

2. Prior Work
Prior work in supply chain management has
largely focused on access, such as just-in-time
manufacturing, and the necessary modeling to ensure
that access [6, 7, 8]. Modeling a network is a critical
area that is well suited to cross the boundaries of
different fields, but is not broad enough to allow for
the discussion on integrity and confidentiality. In
this paper, we have drawn from these sources to
build a definition for the network of a supply chain.
Supply chain security has been of great interest
to the governments and militaries of various
countries [9, 10], with a focus on ensuring that the
products received are not fake/counterfeit or
maliciously tampered with. From the language laid
out in these procurement and regulatory guidance,
we were able to draw a basis for the definition of
integrity.
Most of our work on supply chain
confidentiality has been drawn from prior work on
supply chain privacy; most organizations wish to

4505

reduce public information about their supply chain.
[11] However, there has been an increase in the
research performed on methods for safely and
securely communicating information about a supply
chain, including both vertical exchanges [12] and
horizontally [13].

3. Taxonomy
As described in the introduction, both "security"
and "supply chain" have a range of different
meanings in different applications. This taxonomy
will isolate and fix certain meanings, as they will be
needed for the later framework.

3.1. Security
The term "security" has been defined as a
combination of confidentiality, integrity, and
availability for the information and cyber realms.
This definition has been well explored and accepted;
as such, it is used as the base for the supply chain
security definition.
Confidentiality
One of the main historical tenants of security has
been confidentiality. Troop movements, the details of
a secret sauce formula, and news of a possible merger
with another company all require confidentiality.
Confidentiality is defined by Bishop [14] as not
allowing unauthorized users to access information or
objects. For the purpose of this framework,
confidentiality is keeping information about the
supply chain (e.g. intellectual property, contracts,
and shipping plans) limited to authorized users.
Integrity
Information that has integrity is complete, without
fault, and correctly functioning. In the supply chain,
this translates to integrity being the ability to trust
that the element that has just been moved or
otherwise changed is still possessing of the same level
of integrity as it had prior to the change. [15]
For example, if a pound of ground beef with high
integrity goes through an untrusted process, the
output has low integrity (having possibly experienced
uncertain and or unsafe additives/treatments). The
integrity of the overall supply chain is dependent
upon the correctness of the network. Integrity asks the
questions: Did the parts go where, and only where,
they are supposed to? Did they get routed through
some untrusted third party? Was it the best route
possible?
Availability
To be useful, an object must be accessible when
and where it is wanted, in the form it is needed. A
breakdown in availability means a stoppage in the
movement of the supply chain. Where confidentiality
explores denying unauthorized users access,
availability seeks to ensure that authorized users have
access. [16] Availability in the supply chain requires
that all of the machinery, trucks, people, products,

Figure 1. Simple Supply Chain

electricity and so on are available when and where
needed.
Availability is not a binary measurement. An
element will rarely be completely cut off with no
availability. Instead, an element may have reduced
availability due to higher cost or transportation
interruptions.

3.2. Supply Chain
Describing a supply chain as "a network in which
processes act upon elements" divides the supply chain
into the objects that we are acting upon (the
elements), the actions performed on those elements
(the processes), and the physical structure (the
network) needed to perform those actions. We can
evaluation a portion of the supply chain by looking
back from a specific output element. Graphically, we
can describe a supply chain as shown in Fig. 1. A
sample supply chain is presented in Fig. 2.
Elements
An element is an item (e.g. a hot dog, an
integrated circuit (IC), an iPad, a book, etc.). An
element is both the output of the supply chain and the
input. Each element can be combined with other
elements to create a higher level element. For
example, an IC may be created through the supply
chain and then combined with other elements like an
LCD screen, software, and a network control board to
create a SCADA control system. That SCADA
control system may then be joined with elements such
as a nuclear reactor and cooling system to create a
nuclear power plant.
This idea of elements and sub-elements allows us
to look at both the end element as it is delivered and
any of the input elements at any step of the supply
chain. A flexible level of granularity is necessary to
allow for the application of this term to many
production fields, or to allow the exploration of the
security metrics at different stages in the supply
chain.
Processes
The processes are actions that transform elements
into higher level elements. These actions may include
terms like "mix" (in baking instructions) and "solder"
(in construction of a printed circuit board), and more
temporal terms like "rest", or spatial terms including
"transport" and "lift". A process may result in the
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joining of two or more elements into a higher level
element, or it may describe the transformation of a
single element into another single element that is
further along the supply chain. It can also include the
creation of a element, through a transfer from the
human mind to a physical product; this can be seen in
the creation of software, literature, or art.
A process can be performed via a machine, an
individual's direct or indirect actions, or by basic
physical functions such as gravity. The process needs
the instantiation of the network to act upon the
elements.
Network
The network are the elements and the
interconnection of those elements that perform

processes on other elements. Everything from roads
and factories to trucks and ink pens and how they
work together makes up the network. A network is
easy to visualize when considering a final element.
Take a piece of paper and work backwards to look at
every physical item that has touched that piece of
paper or any of its input elements, as in the top of Fig.
2. The piece of paper was changed from pulp to paper
in a given factory, and that given factory has specific
tools that process the pulp. That factory and all of the
equipment it contains is part of the paper's supply
chain. Moving further back is the sawmill that made
the pulp and the forest that provided the tree. We also
must include any of the roads and vehicles that were
used to move any of these input elements.

Figure 2. Intermediate Supply Chain

Figure 3. Supply Chain with Single Depth Line
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3.3. The Challenge of Including People
Throughout the entire supply chain people are
needed to push the button to make the process start, to
use the network to move elements, to provide the
intelligence to apply processes in a given order, and
to lay out the network in the best way. Is a human a
process or an network object? For the purpose of this
framework if the human body is used (lifting,
moving), it is part of the network. If the human mind
is involved (following instructions, choosing a path),
it is part of the processes.

3.4. Depth
The "full depth" of a given supply chain is a very
complex thing. Many supply chains may contribute to
the chain of leading to the final element of interest,
creating a massive depth to the supply chain analysis.
We must ask, can the tools that make the tools that
make perform the processes be trusted? What of the
tools that make the tools that make the tools? How far
down the rabbit hole must we go to ensure full, 100%
security of the supply chain for a piece of paper? This
problem is a rapidly expanding one, as can be seen in
Figure 3, and at some point we must trust the supply
chain.
The authors of this paper do not have the answer,
and doubt that a definitive answer will be provided in
the near future, to a method for ensuring the full
depth the supply chain is secure. This problem is too
complex to simply map, much less solve. Therefore,
we suggest focusing on a limited subset of critical
input elements and processes. By considering the
important properties of your output product, you can

provide selectively greater depth for processes and
objects that influence those properties. The
complexity of the supply chain can become
unmanageable unless limited to reasonable depth and
scope.

4. Research Framework
The previous section described two groups of
terms - those that describe security and those that
describe the supply chain. Another way to look at this
is having a description of what will happen and a
description of the subject of those actions. Integrity,
confidentiality, and availability may exist in any of
the network, processes, and elements. This section
will provide a framework that describes this
combination of needs and areas.
The table in Figure 4 gives a visual overview of
this idea with brief examples included. This table
serves to give a high-level overview of the framework
but is not highly comprehensive. A fully-formed
framework would require a much larger document
and a specific field or element's supply chain. Since
this is not useful for exploring how to apply this
framework to a wide array of areas and does not
contribute towards sharing overall security principles
between fields, this discussion will remain in broad
terms.
It should be noted that while each of these areas
of security and supply chain components are
generally described as standalone concepts - each
with its own areas of concern and research, there are
actually a myriad of interconnects. To ease the
introduction of this concept these interconnects are
glossed over here. Later work(s) will be dedicated to
exploring them.

Confidentiality

Information
about
suppliers, capabilities, or
routes
are
kept
confidential.

The exact process steps or
types are kept confidential.

Intellectual property about
the element is kept
confidential

Integrity

The layout of the objects in
the network is correct and
efficient

The workers performing
the processes are trained
properly
and
correct
instructions are available.

The element is what it
claims to be (e.g., not
counterfeit).

Availability

The physical structure of
the
network
is
not
disrupted, slowed, or made
unavailable.

The workers and the
equipment
needed
to
perform the processes are
available.

As an input to either a new
supply chain or to a
retailer, the element is
available when and where
needed.

Network
Figure 4. Research Framework
for Supply Chain SecurityProcess

Element
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4.1. Network
Confidentiality
When competing for limited resources, a
company may wish to keep its suppliers secret. The
choice of suppliers may reveal information to a
competitor or attacker. The organization of objects in
the network within a single facility may reveal where
elements may be stolen or replaced with counterfeits.
Either the objects that make up the supply chain or
their specific layouts may need to remain confidential
for an organization to remain competitive or
trustworthy.
Recently, this could be seen in the friction
between Samsung and Apple, as they fought over
LCD screens made by Sharp. Because Sharp has
limited resources, the confidentiality breach that
allowed Samsung to learn of Apple's dependence on
the supplier led to an availability problem with
Samsung attempting to purchase all of the available
screens. New competitors may also try to take
advantage of who exactly is supplying what to their
competitors to find sources of their own. [17, 18]
Integrity
The integrity of the network is critical for chain of
custody concerns. If the network is incorrect or
nondeterministic, it cannot be trusted that the
processes have been performed correctly and the
elements are what they should be. A network with
high determinism is also efficient, providing a correct
layout of objects without delays and deviations.
When considering the integrity of the network, both
the objects (the machines, trucks, and roads) and the
layout of those objects are equally important.
Unexpected deviations in the network, such as the
re-routing of an airplane carrying freight to an
untrusted nation, is a violation of the integrity of the
network. If unknown or uncertain processes have
been applied at the locations along the network that
the element must pass, the network cannot claim it
has integrity. In this way, the integrity of the network
affects the integrity of the whole supply chain.
Availability
The availability of the network is easily described
as anything that disrupts the physical structure of the
supply chain is a failure of availability. This
disruption may be complete, totally denying the
supply chain use of a piece of machinery or a road, or
partial, with only a delay to the accessibility of the
object. This delay is a concern for any organization
because it can decrease supply and drive up prices,
hurting the bottom line.
In 2011, the Great Tohoku Earthquake and
Tsunami shut down much of the automotive
production in Japan and nearby countries. As a result
of this lapse in availability, Japanese automakers
suffered a loss in market share and users of these
vehicles experienced an increase in repair costs. On
the other end of the supply chain, the workers who
provide the brain-power behind the processes were

also affected by a decrease in wages due to plant
shutdowns. [19]

4.2. Processes
Due to its data-based nature, process security
comes much closer to traditional information
security than the security of the elements or network.
While it is possible to affect the integrity of a
process, keeping the details of the process
confidential is a more common concern.
Confidentiality
The methods used to perform an action are often
as valuable as the output of that action. The exact
process steps need to be kept confidential to allow the
organization to maintain its competitive edge. To
provide physical security, the organization may need
to keep information about the people performing the
processes confidential.
In traditional Japanese sword-smithing, the exact
steps, temperatures, and folding techniques used to
create a masterwork samurai edged weapon, such as a
katana or naginata, were considered both sacred and
highly confidential. [20] The weapon itself is of great
value, but the skill of the smith and the process he
followed to create the weapon is of much greater
value. The confidentiality of the information the
smith imparted to his apprentices was of the utmost
importance.
Integrity
The integrity of the processes is maintained
through mechanisms such as correctly training
workers or appropriately calibrating the machines
used to perform the process. A process without
integrity will not perform the appropriate action upon
the element Sometimes this is loss of integrity is
immediately recognized, but often it may be that the
alteration, especially if malicious, will not be
instantly detected.
While software is not often considered in a
traditional supply chain mindset, it is still an element
which has processes operating on it. In the early
2000's, the integrity of Microsoft's operating system
code was called into question. In response,
Microsoft's upper management famously decreed a
halt to all work for two weeks in order to provide
mandatory security training. [21] In this way, they
were able to increase the integrity of their output
element, the software, through an increase in the
integrity of the processes through which they created
the software.
Availability
To perform some processes, there must be
workers and electricity available, as well as the
instructions or knowledge for those workers to carry
out the process. Without the availability of the
processes, the network changes from a very dynamic
system into a static, largely useless set of objects. The
elements can no longer move or change and are stuck
where they currently reside.

4509

The lack of workers is a serious problem for
leaders in China, who are beginning to feel the effects
of the one-child policy. [22] Without the workers to
perform basic tasks in factories, it may soon be
impossible for Chinese-based companies to provide
the extremely cheap products for which they have
been known for the last decade. This lack of
availability of people to perform processes may have
worldwide impacts, shifting manufacturing to other
realms and increasing wages in China.

4.3. Elements
Confidentiality
The intellectual property surrounding many
elements is often critical to an organization and
keeping the exact understanding of how an element
works out of unauthorized hands is of high priority.
This can include the need to keep an element
confidential to prevent reverse engineering or to
provide confidentiality for the data contained in an
element. [23]
In the military world, the need for confidentiality
of the design of elements, such as airplanes, goes to a
new level. To ensure that these elements did not find
themselves in unfriendly hands, the military in WWII
designed auto-destruct features to destroy any subelement that required complete confidentiality. This
could be seen in the auto-destruct designed into the
Norden bomb-sights. This ensured the confidentiality
of the design, should it fall into enemy hands. [24]
Integrity
The integrity of an element is critical, both for an
element that is an end-item (a computer or a pizza)
and for an element that will be combined with other
elements to make a more complex element. End-item
elements are directly used by individuals and as such
are subject to stringent controls on allowable
chemicals, labeling, and other integrity-based
controls. A lack of integrity in a sub-element may
affect the integrity of the super-element. Without
understanding the integrity of sub-elements, the
integrity of the super-element cannot be asserted.
Counterfeit handbags, Trojan Horses in software,
and improperly labeled fish are all breakdowns in the
mechanisms that should protect the integrity of the
element. While counterfeit handbags have a direct
effect on the profitability of a company, other
counterfeits have recently been seen coming into the
market that are much more serious; a recent IEEE
magazine article highlighted the practice of re-using
old integrated circuits or other elements that may be
used in critical systems. [25]
Availability
Without the elements, a network has no purpose
and the processes have nothing to act upon. As such,
the availability of the elements is critical for the
correct movement of the entire supply chain. The
sub-elements must be available when and where
needed to create higher-level elements, and output
elements must be available when and where people

need them. A high level of availability ensures that
the supply chain moves along; where as a low level of
availability may cause stoppages or slowdowns
throughout the entire depth and breadth of the supply
chain.
Ensuring the availability of elements has been a
major concern for just-in-time manufacturing. A great
deal of work has been performed in this area by a
range of researchers [26, 27, 28] to ensure that the
availability of elements is supported. This area is of
concern to both industry partners with a bottom line
to consider, as well as governmental organizations,
such as the military or Department of Energy, who
may need specific and hard to acquire minerals or
basic elements (such as uranium, magnesium or
tungsten).

4.4. Tradeoffs and Supports
There are tradeoffs between the goals in supply
chain security. For example, having an element be
available immediately might decrease the amount of
time to ensure the integrity of the element. However,
there can also be places where the goals support each
other. For example, high confidentiality of the steps
of a process may ensure that the output element has
higher integrity. The availability of an element will
support the availability of the network, and the
integrity of the network will help to ensure the
integrity of the elements.

5. Case Studies
Adaptation of an existing paradigm to a novel
field is nothing new. New regulatory rules are often
grounded to some level of fidelity in existing
regulation. There are advantages and disadvantages to
this, but it is often a matter of expediency or
efficiency. While it not always the intent, the lessons
learned in applying a regulatory framework to a new
field, and the ability to translate the outcomes in the
new field back to the parent field, may outweigh the
disadvantages by gaining novel insight on the
established field and seeing the new subject from the
perspective forced by fitting it to the existing
framework. By creating this framework and
taxonomy, the authors hope to encourage the sharing
and re-evaluation of specific supply chains.

5.1. Adaptation of Maritime Precedence
Rules to Aviation
In the early 20th century, the field of aviation
began growing to a size and at a rate that necessitated
navigational guidelines. It cannot be proven, but the
aviation etiquette adopted by early aviators suggests
that the rules of maritime navigation were adapted
naturally and then codified into law. Even if this is
not the case, if aviation were to spring fully formed
into the modern world without the benefit of history,
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it would be reasonable to base aviation regulation in
maritime navigation norms.
In many ways, this adaptation of the basic rules
was beneficial. The green light on the right side, red
on the left, maritime lighting standard works equally
well on aircraft and this standard is now being
adapted to work on the Cygnus spacecraft. [29]
Similarly, rules on overtaking, approaching head-on,
and converging in FAA regulations [30], taken from
the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea [31], are highly applicable.
However, some modifications are needed when
adapting the maritime to the aviation. For example,
[30] cover several situations involving fishing
vessels; it is unlikely that many aircraft will hover in
a single location for hours at a time, negating the need
for such a rule.

5.2. Adaptation of the Toxicology
Framework to Nanotechnology
Nanoparticles are an example of a technology
whose products became commonplace so rapidly that
there was no time to develop a completely new
regulatory regime. Currently most nanoparticles are
regulated by toxicological rules as chemicals [32].
Toxicological assays and regulatory rules were
mainly developed for drug safety testing decades ago
and have found further use regulating pesticides,
chemicals, cosmetics and foodstuffs. It was logically
extended to nanotoxicology regulations, especially
when the nano-product falls into one of these
categories. There is strong evidence however, that
nanoparticles cannot be assumed to have the same
properties as their parent compounds. Nanopreparations of compounds have been shown to have
significantly different kinetics of adsorption,
dispersion, metabolism, and excretion [33] , and
novel biological interactions emergent from
nanoparticle properties that have toxic effect
pathways not shown by the parent compound. [34]
Silver and Gold, elements normally considered to
have minimal reactivity, have demonstrated
nanoparticle size and shape dependent effects on
cellular uptake and anti-microbial activity. [35, 36]
Thus, the potential toxic effects or effective dose of
nanoparticles cannot be extrapolated from knowledge
of their chemical composition.
Unfortunately, there are documented cases of
nanotoxicology reinventing safety testing for
cytotoxicity and mutagenicity without drawing from
the decades of development and validation of these
assays for chemicals used in cosmetics. [33, 36]
There is strong evidence that modern assays
developed and optimized for nanotoxicology will be
adaptable to the benefit of toxicology and the other
fields for which classical toxicology has become
crucial. [37, 38, 39, 40] The specific properties of
nanoparticles illustrate the disadvantage of using
regulation and protocols born of another field. The
rapid construction of a useful framework that has
been adapted to suit the new field demonstrates the

advantages of this approach. Further, this common
framework appears to be facilitating technological
transfer between fields.

6. Future Paths
This paper laid out a general map of the supply
chain security world, sketching in rough borders and
creating a basic shared language. This work needs to
be expanded upon in a variety of directions.
Each field, be it electronic manufacturing, meat
processing, or jewelry crafting, needs to customize
this framework to better fit that specific world. The
selected terminology was left broad to accommodate
for this and to facilitate the sharing across fields, but
there needs to be depth into the field to support the
breadth.
The current framework is currently limited by the
definition of security as confidentiality, integrity, and
availability. Future research should be directed to
developing a more specific set of definitions for
security that grows deeper into subsets of CIA.
Authorization, non-repudiation, privacy, and faulttolerance need to be considered as well.
Feedback from more researchers on this
framework and the applicability to their field is
critical. The creators of this framework come from
computer science and biology backgrounds; more
business and manufacturing people are needed to
explore the framework and taxonomy and develop a
more well-rounded system.
Finally, more research is needed to fill in the
holes of the framework in each specific field. The
original purpose of this framework was to detail
where research had been performed and where more
focus was needed. For example, in the integrated
circuit world, more research is needed into evaluating
the integrity of an element. Each field will likely have
areas that are needful of more attention.
Further crossing research between fields is also
needed. It may be that the research done on
availability of the processes for the furniture building
field can be modified and applied to the availability
of the processes for petroleum processing. Currently,
there is much reinventing of the wheel in different
fields and research is needed to help the research
cross fields.

7. Conclusions
In this paper, a high-level taxonomy was
presented to facilitate research in supply chain
security. A basic map of the research world in supply
chain security was laid out and filled in, and case
studies presented to give examples of situations
where the framework for one realm has been applied
to another successfully. By combining the
cyber/information security definition with a novel
description of the supply chain, our goal has been
accomplished. The next step will be to move forward
towards refining this framework and taxonomy.
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